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THE UNITED STATES' NATIONAL INTERESTS
IN CENTRAL ASIA

by

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14. ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Central Asia consists of five newly independent states situated between Russia, China, and Iran halfway around the world from the United States. For the last eight years, the Central Asian States (CAS) have been the object of considerable attention from the United States. The focus of this research is to identify what national interests the United States has in Central Asia, how national interests link to U.S. foreign policy, and explain the benefits and implications of the U.S. pursuing engagement and development in the region.

Although the political, economic, and military costs of U.S. engagement in Central Asia are high, so are the benefits. The long-term benefits to the U.S. will be having a more stable (less volatile) region and access to its significant natural resources.

The 1999 version of “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” (NSS), states the U.S.’ national interests in Central Asia as: (1) supporting continued democratization in the five Central Asian States (CAS), (2) promoting prosperity, (3) enhancing security in the region, (4) pursuing arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and (5) integration in the larger community (a political and economic goal). This research paper organizes the U.S.’ national interests in Central Asia into three categories: political, economic, and military and a detailed discussion of the interests then flows from each of the three categories.

Based on President Clinton’s 1999 NSS, policy announcements made by The State Department, and legislation introduced in Congress, I believe the U.S. has identified that it has

overall “important” national interests in Central Asia. Although the implications of the U.S. having important interests in Central Asia affect the world at large, the primarily affect is on Russia, who also has important and multiple national interests there.

There is one primary implication and one probable outcome from the U.S.’ stated interest in Central Asia. The significant implication is that the U.S. will be willing to, and because it is a superpower, able to, synchronize its use of the instruments of power to deter others from creating instability in Central Asia, a region it considers important. If deterrence fails, the U.S. has the ability to militarily defend its interests in the region. A likely outcome of the U.S.’ national interest in Central Asia is that a rivalry for influence, possibly even conflict, may result between Russia and the U.S. A result of each state having a national interest in Central Asia could be each state having an increased stake in the outcomes of their internal affairs. One positive outcome of the engagement and development activities Russia and the U.S. are pursuing should be greater economic development within the five CAS. One undesirable possible outcome of an interstate rivalry for influence between Russia and the U.S. is greater regional instability-the exact opposite effect the U.S. desires for Central Asia.

Research was pursued using the Air University’s Library, the Internet, and by telephone. The information gathered came from books, articles, web-sites, and from interviews with experts of Central Asia.

Part 1

Introduction

The Central Asian States (CAS), consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, became independent states after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (U.S.S.R.) dissolution in 1991 (see Appendix A for a map of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which includes Central Asia). Since 1991, two regional powers (China, Russia), a superpower (The United States), and to a lesser degree, Islamic neighbors (Iran, Turkey) have entered into many political, economic, and/or military agreements with one or more of the five CAS and have invested heavily there. The location of the CAS between two regional powers, China and Russia, and its large size and natural resources make the CAS worthy of interest by all of her neighbors and by some states far removed. The United States is a recent protagonist influencing Central Asian governments through her engagement and development activities.

The research into Central Asia is significant because the U.S. government has stated that it has a national interest in the CAS; national interests lead to creating policy that supports the interests; and policy affects where taxpayer dollars are spent. Policy also effects when and where and why the four instruments of power (IOPs), diplomacy, economics, information, and the military are employed. How and where the U.S. uses its IOPs affects its citizens and the world, especially other nations like Russia, that also have national interests in Central Asia.

Part 2

The Central Asian States

The nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan form what is collectively and loosely called the Central Asian States (CAS) by Western nations. The new nations are similar enough in several ways to be “grouped” together by Westerners for purposes of analysis for the following reasons: their common history of Soviet domination for approximately 70 years led to centrally-run economies and governments that largely still exist; their sudden independence in 1991 from merely being Soviet republics; authoritarian-led democracies that scarcely resemble Western-style parliamentary or representative democracy; economies that are generally poor, although several have a great abundance of resources; and the common bond of Islam that 70% of the population shares (See Appendix B for a comparison of the Central Asian States).

Overview of Central Asia

In the 1800s, Russia and England, both 19th-century empire builders, played out what Rudyard Kipling, the English author, called “The Great Game”, in his book, Kim.¹ Kipling was referring to a rivalry for influence in Central Asia between Russia and England. Russia, advancing south and south-east towards India, was blocked by England, trying to keep total influence over India. In the early 1980s, the West, primarily the United States, tried to block further Soviet expansion south by aiding rebels in the Afghanistan civil war.

The CAS' 20th century history is closely tied to the U.S.S.R. For over 70 years, the U.S.S.R. dominated the five republics and organized centrally run governments and economies taking orders from Moscow. The CAS became independent and sovereign on December 21, 1991, after representatives from the five republics met with representatives of Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine.² At the same time, the CAS joined the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).³ The five states have never existed as modern states before and as a result, "...are still in a process of determining their true character, interests, allies, and opponents."⁴

Islamic influence

Of the 50 million people living in the five CAS, 35 million are Sunni Muslim. Through most of the 70 years of the U.S.S.R.'s rule, the Soviets tried to destroy the Islamic self-identity and replace it with a secular identity. Late in the 1980s, a grass-roots movement and greater religious tolerance by the U.S.S.R. led to a resurgence of Islamic feeling throughout most of the CAS. Since 1991, Islam has partly filled the void created when the average citizen suddenly was stripped of his Soviet identity and left with only his national identity.⁵ Islam, which hasn't ever had as strong a pull on religious and daily life as in other Islamic states, has made a comeback, more in breadth across the republics, than in depth. Islam has also become a political tool by government leaders and non-state actors, such as the Islamic Revival Party (IRP).⁶

Cultural and Population make-up

Due to Central Asia being a region of great complexity, and because "It is inhabited by many peoples and tribes, speaking many languages, and belonging to many and varied cultural traditions", one cannot broadly categorize all the peoples of Central Asia.⁷ The many variants of languages stem from two; Turkic and Persian. All of the peoples in Central Asia speak the basic language stem of Turkic except in Tajikistan where they speak Persian.

Economic make-up

The five nations are, in varying degrees, in the middle of a large and disruptive change from a communist state-run and controlled economic system to one of a free market system. Since 1991, the CAS have seen the disintegration of a unified Soviet economy, disruption of ties between the former republics, frequent changes in economic policy, and rapid moves towards privatization.⁸ The five CAS started independence with a well established, if inefficient economic base, which has helped them make the difficult transition to a market economy. “Under socialism, central Asia was used only as a supplier of raw materials”, not finished goods for export and the republics “...were never allowed to build the kind of production centers that would enable them to exploit their wealth.”⁹ Although foreign assistance and investment from nations outside of Central Asia have helped modernize and stabilize the economies and avert economic collapse, the average citizen in each of the CAS is poor.

Political make-up.

Although the CAS call themselves democratic republics, in no way can the CAS be regarded as having democracies in a Western sense. None have a competitive political party system, a free market economy, or a well-developed rule of law that applies fairly to all citizens. The governments largely rule using authoritarian methods. Although all of the national leaders in the CAS use the title, “President” and say they hold democratic elections, one must use caution in understanding what democracy means to them. See Appendix J for examples of limitations on democracy.

Notes

¹ Rudyard Kipling, *Kim*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1962), viii.

Notes

² Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence." *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 71, Issue 3 (Summer 1992): 108.

³ Ibid, p 108.

⁴ Fuller, Graham E. "The Asian interior." *Orbis* Vol 38, Issue 4 (Fall 94): 545.

⁵ Akiner, Shirin. "On its own." *Harvard International Review* Vol 15, Issue 3 (Spring 93): 19.

⁶ Ibid. 19.

⁷ Kazemzadeh, Firuz. "United States Policy toward Central Asia, caution and moderation." *City News Publishing Co.* Vol 58, Issue 22 (9/1/92): 678.

⁸ Rumer, Boris and Zhukov Stanislav, ed. *Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998, p. 4.

⁹ Darrow, Siobhan. "Ancient lands, modern times." *NCC.com*, 17 October 1995. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://www.cnn.com>.

Part 3

The importance of Central Asia's geography

The territory of the formerly Soviet regions of Central Asia, which lies at the heart of the Eurasian land mass, encompassing an area of some four million square kilometers. The strategic importance of this region, together with its world-class reserves of minerals and hydrocarbons, makes it the focus of considerable international interest.

— Shirin Akiner

The CAS are strategically important to other nations because of their physical location (bordering two great regional powers, China and Russia); large size; abundant resources (especially oil rich Caspian Sea); and as a conduit for trade (the old Silk Road, modern East Asia-European trade link). Central Asia has huge reserves of oil and natural gas, large amounts of minerals, such as gold and manganese, and grows cotton extensively. The problem for the CAS and her neighbors is deciding what countries will be chosen to transport the valuable natural resources out of the region for sale and in what direction (through Russia, Iran, or Turkey).

The resources at stake

Central Asia has immense oil and natural gas reserves (see Appendix C-G for oil and natural gas amounts and comparisons). “Kazakhstan’s 22 major oil fields hold as much as 95 billion barrels. Turkmenistan may be sitting on up to 33 billion barrels but is currently producing mainly natural gas.”¹ By way of comparison, Saudi Arabia holds the world’s largest petroleum

reserves, 235 billion barrels and 25% of the world's total; Kuwait has 94 billion barrels and 10 % of the world's reserves; and Qatar has 3.7 billion barrels of oil.² Qatar also has 7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which is 5% of the world's total, and has the third largest natural gas deposit in the world.³ Most oil and natural gas deposits ring the Caspian Sea, sitting under Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan has the world's fourth largest natural gas reserve but the problem is getting the gas to market; the only pipeline goes to Russia.⁴ That monopoly over gas transport will be ending during the first decade of the 21st century as the construction of one gas pipeline is already scheduled (The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline-see Part 4, "Economic interests" section for more details) and "...sixteen major oil and gas pipeline projects are in various states of realization" to deliver energy from the Caspian Basin to Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.⁵

Central Asia also has large deposits of other natural resources. Uzbekistan, having the world's largest open pit of gold, has made plenty of investment deals and increased production with new machines over what the former Soviet Union could output using older technology.⁶ Kazakhstan has approximately 10 percent of the world's reserves of iron-ore, 19 percent of the lead, 13 percent of the zinc, 10 percent of copper, 30 percent of chrome iron ore, and 25 percent of the world's manganese.⁷

Who will transport the oil and natural gas out?

The challenge to getting the oil out isn't technical, but political. The shortest way to get the gas and oil to Europe is north through Russia, but Russia has a bad history of over-controlling Central Asian events and could block pipeline shipment of oil and natural gas to suit its own purposes. To the west lies the unstable nation of Azerbaijan. To the south, lies politically controversial (from a Russian and Western, including American, perspective) Iran, who wants to

increase its influence and revenue by allowing oil and gas to transship its land to the Arabian Gulf. The Clinton administration opposes oil transfers through Iran for political reasons.

Russia, the regional hegemon, wants future pipelines laid down through its territory so it can profit from the transit revenues and influence how much goes through and when it goes through, giving it undue access and denial influence. Currently, there are two oil pipelines leading to Europe, "...one from Baku, Azerbaijan, via Russia to Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea, and another through Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa."⁸ Western oil companies and their governments want future routes to go due west, running 1000 miles from Baku through independent Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.⁹ This route is favored by the US because it will avoid Russia to the north and Iran to the south and go through Western-friendly and fellow NATO ally Turkey.

Notes

¹ "Central Asia's 'Texas Tea'; a rapidly acquired taste." CNN.com, 2 September 1999, CNN on-line.

² "The World Factbook 1999." On-line. Internet, 1999. Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Darrow, Siobhan. "Ancient lands, modern times." NCC.com, 17 October 1995. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://www.cnn.com>.

⁵ Martin, Josh. "Pipeline to Profits." *Management Review*, April 1999, p. 48.

⁶ Darrow, Siobhan. "Ancient lands, modern times." NCC.com, 17 October 1995. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://www.cnn.com>.

⁷ Rumer, Boris, and Zhukov, Stanislav, ed. *Central Asia-The Challenges of Independence*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p. 23.

⁸ Zuckerman, Mortimer B. "The big game gets bigger." *U.S. News & World Report* Vol 126, Issue 18 (10 May 1999): p76.

⁹ Ibid. p. 76.

Part 4

The United States' National Interests in Central Asia

The end of the Cold War has brought about a moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity. We must not waste it. We must not lose it. That is why the United States is pursuing a variety of mutually reinforcing policies and programs whose goal is to nurture, protect, and sustain market democracies throughout the world.

— Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

Identification of national interests

Nations have a variety of interests, ranging from political to economic to cultural. For the purposes of this paper, the interests being examined are those that have national-level foreign policy importance. At this point, it is necessary to ask, “What is a strategic interest” and “How does one differentiate a ‘strategic interest’ from a ‘national interest?’” Some definitions of interests are provided from a diplomatic and policy viewpoint in Figure 1, along with definitions of the three levels of interests that were identified in the newest (1999) version of “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” (NSS).¹

As explained in the NSS, the U.S.’ national interests in the CAS are (1) supporting continued democratization, (2) promoting prosperity, (3) enhancing security in the region, (4) pursuing arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and (5) integration in the larger community (political and economic goals).² In the U.S., once identification of national interests is made and their importance realized, foreign policy is

Interests			
TYPE	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE	
National	The relationship a state perceives to exist between its security, well-being, and power, and the security, well-being, and power of other states	Security from attack from another nation	
Strategic	An interest, often geopolitical or economic in nature, that a state perceives as likely over time to determine its ability to defend or promote its vital interests	Freedom to navigate ships in international waters without foreign interference	
National security	The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that defines goals or purposes	Desiring economic prosperity; a population free from enemy attack	
Levels of Interests (per NSS)			
Vital	Those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of a nation	Protection of a nation's people territory and infrastructure	
Important	These do not affect national survival, but they do affect national well-being and the character of the world in which we live	Protecting the global environment from severe harm; ensuring the protection of allies	
Humanitarian and other	The interests a nation has because of the values the society holds important	Supporting democratization; responding to natural and man-made disasters	

Figure 1. Interests and levels of interests³

determined by the President (executive branch) to support those national interests. In a speech made in 1997, Mr. Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, announced that U.S. support of Central Asia has four dimensions: "...the promotion of democracy, the creation of free market economies, the sponsorship of peace and cooperation within and among the countries of the region, and their integration with the larger international community."⁴ Secretary Talbott added, "as long as they [CAS] move in the direction of political and economic freedom, of

national and international reconciliation, we will be with them.”⁵ Mr. Graham E. Fuller, a former government official, also identified the U.S.’ significant interests in the CAS.

Contributing to the book, “Central Asia”, written in 1994, Graham E. Fuller, a Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation and former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, wrote a chapter entitled, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in which he identifies six primary interests.⁶ The six primary interests, listed in Figure 2, are presented because Mr. Fuller’s list is the most comprehensive identification and discussion of American national interests in Central Asia I found apart from the NSS. He is a recognized authority in the political science field. Most of the national interests Mr. Fuller identified were the same ones chosen for use, perhaps unknowingly, by the two U.S. Presidential

1. Arrange American policies vis-à-vis Russia to avoid a reemerged radical or ideological Russia that could return the world to global nuclear confrontation. Work to ensure security of the Russian diaspora in Central Asia. Ensure Russia evolves as a democratic and moderate state in the international community.
2. Avoid or maintain damage control over further civil war or breakup of nations that will spill over into neighboring states. Avoid regional ethnic conflict by the many minorities in Central Asia.
3. Avoid nuclear proliferation.
4. Avoid the development of radical anti-western forms of political Islam in the region. The problem is with radical governments that polarize the struggle between Islam and non-Islamic societies, not Islam itself.
5. Support the growth of human rights, democracy, free market economies and a cleaner global environment.
6. Enable the United States to play a role in the economic development of the region, especially its raw materials.

Figure 2. Graham E. Fuller’s list of American national interests in Central Asia⁷

administrations, President Bush's and President Clinton's, in power since the CAS gained independence in 1991.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott explained why the U.S. has national interests in Central Asia at an U.S.-Central Asia Business Conference on May 3, 1994. Secretary Talbott said that "Central Asia is a gateway to three regions that are of great strategic importance to the United States: To the east lie China and the rest of Asia; to the south lie Iran, Afghanistan, and the Islamic world; to the west and north lie Russia and Europe. Moreover, Central Asia is a region of vast natural and human resources offering the potential for the prosperity of its own people and benefits for American entrepreneurs with the foresight to do business there."⁸ To what degree or level does the U.S. consider Central Asia an important interest?

The NSS places the United States' national interests into three categories: vital, important, and humanitarian and other, with vital interests being most important to a nation (See Figure 1).⁹ Based upon the emphasis given in the NSS of promoting democratization, prosperity, and the rule of law; through administration policy statements; and because of the economic stake (investment, humanitarian aid) the U.S. has made in Central Asia since 1991, I believe the U.S. has an overall "important" interest in Central Asia. The NSS, in its "Integrated Regional Approaches" section, makes numerous references to how important security, democratization, continued reform, prosperity, and access to energy resources are in the Newly Independence States and Central Asia.¹⁰ An important interest is one of national importance, worth strengthening and defending politically, economically, and militarily. The United States' national interests will be discussed next using three main categories: political, economic, and military.

Political interests

In the U.S., although national policy flows from the executive branch, support for national policy comes from the legislative branch that approves budgets for allocation and ratifies treaties. The importance of Central Asia to the U.S. can be demonstrated by executive and legislative (Congressional) level support for continued involvement and engagement.

Legislative support for Central Asian engagement

The U.S. Congress has submitted numerous bills and resolutions relating to Central Asia. Members of the 105th Congress (1997-1998) introduced 27 pieces of legislation and the 106th Congress (1999-2000) has already introduced 16 bills, amendments, and resolutions on a wide variety of subjects involving Central Asia.¹¹ Examples include the exportation of goods from Tajikistan, Foreign Service Officer training, normalized trade relations with Kyrgyzstan, and foreign operations and their appropriations. The most significant of the 106th Congress' bills, in my estimation, is House Resolution 1152 (reintroduced because it didn't pass during the last Congress). It would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to "target assistance to support the economic and political independence of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia" (see Appendix H for details of the proposed legislation).¹² Known as The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, the resolution, if passed, will have wide-ranging effects for the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The bill would support promoting reconciliation and recovery from regional conflicts in the region; fostering economic growth through developing policies, laws, and regulations to help develop free market economies and to join the World Trade Organization; border control assistance to limit arms and narcotics trafficking; assisting regional military cooperation; and strengthening democracy, tolerance, and the development of civil society.¹³ The wording of the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 was changed slightly before

being included as part of HR 2606 in Section 596, a bill called “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2000”.¹⁴ HR 2606 was sent to President Clinton for signature but was vetoed by him on October 18, 1999.¹⁵ It (HR 2606) was vetoed by the President because it “...fails to address critical national security needs” by not providing enough funding (14 percent below the level that President Clinton requested) for overseas engagement activities.¹⁶ Part of President Clinton’s veto message to the House of Representatives stated that “We cannot afford to underfund programs that support democracy and small scale enterprises in Russia and other New Independent States because these are the very kinds of initiatives needed to complete their transformation away from communism and authoritarianism.”¹⁷ Since the veto in October 1999, HR 2606, resubmitted in November 1999 in two versions, HR3194 and 3422 (but still containing the Silk Road Strategy Act provisions), are working their way through Congress, presently being prepared for Senate debate.¹⁸ The submission of the Silk Road Strategy Act and others is indicative of the support Congress has for closer ties in Central Asia. The first of the two political interests discussed in this paper, democracy, which is contained in the following section, is a key, perhaps the central interest of the U.S in Central Asia.

Democracy

The United States encourages each of the five CAS to continue to democratize their governments. The challenge in the CAS is to overcome over 70 years of Soviet autocratic domination. As much as U.S. Presidents and Congress hope for true democracies in the Western sense, progress towards democratization remains slow (see Appendix J for a more complete assessment of democratization in Central Asia). The NSS identifies enhancing the progress of democracy in the Newly Independent States (of which the CAS is part) as a “national interest.”¹⁹

Later, the NSS states, “The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic and economic reform of the NIS are important to American interests.”²⁰ The methods to reform are to “...help them [NIS] build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption and to advance human rights and the rule of law.”²¹ Maintaining territorial integrity and state security in Central Asia are also important to U.S. interests.

Security

The ability of the CAS to remain fully independent and sovereign is important U.S. national interests. Although each of the five states became independent in 1991, they need time to complete the transition from being a dependent republic under the U.S.S.R. to being independent in their own right, without undue influence and/or threats to their sovereignty. Assistance from international organizations can help.

A good medium to enhance Central Asia’s security is through The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which, the NSS says, will attempt to “...secure peace, deter aggression, and prevent, defuse and manage crises” in Central Asia.²² The OSCE’s role is to organize and monitor elections, monitor human rights, and reduce ethnic and religious tensions in Europe and through the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, the NIS.²³ The NSS states that the OSCE will be the US’ best choice to “...engage all the countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in an effort to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one another when instability, insecurity and human rights violations threaten peace in the region.”²⁴ Besides democratization and security, the U.S. also has important economic interests in Central Asia.

Economic interests

The U.S.' second national interest in the CAS, economic prosperity, is discussed in 1999's NSS and through several public policy announcements. The NSS asserts, "The United States will continue helping the NIS economies integrate into international economic and other institutions and develop healthy business climates".²⁵ During Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's address to the U.S.-Central Asia Business Conference in 1994, he explained that "...the Clinton Administration is eager to promote U.S. trade with Central Asia not only because it promotes our foreign policy goals, but because such trade will create profits and jobs here at home"- a win-win situation for the U.S. and Central Asia.²⁶ Later in the speech Secretary Talbott stated that "...our Administration is investing in the region because it makes good foreign policy sense. That is, we are investing in the region for reasons that go to the heart of what we see as American's vital national interests."²⁷ The U.S. supports Central Asian prosperity through economic integration into the world community and development and access to their considerable natural resources.

Integrating the CAS within the larger world community

Economic progress for the CAS will come about as a result of attracting foreign investment. In the American view, democracy and its rule by law and governments chosen by citizens creates a stable, secure environment that attracts multi-national corporations and other nation's investments, leading to prosperity.²⁸ Concerning integration into the world community, the NSS states the "...integration of Russia, Ukraine, and other NIS with the new Europe and the international community remains a key priority."²⁹

Since their independence, the US has emphasized getting individual CAS to align their programs with or join international organizations such as the World Bank, International

Monetary Fund, and the European Union.³⁰ Results: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan implemented tax reform laws; Kazakhstan started privatization; and Kyrgyzstan established a stock market.³¹ The US also has tried to get the states to establish a Eurasian transportation corridor, eliminate trade barriers among them, and establish a Central Asian Free Economic Zone, which would act as a region-wide market place.³² Economic interests in developing oil and natural gas pipelines from the CAS to Western markets to augment existing supplies also guide Washington's policy.

Economic interests in natural resources

Of particular interest to the U.S. are the Caspian Sea energy resources. Development of oil and gas contributes to prosperity in Central Asia and diversifies world energy supplies.³³ The NSS explains that the U.S. has a "vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil sources. We must continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability and security in key producing areas to ensure our access to, and the free flow of, these resources."³⁴ Washington wants underground pipelines laid to take the oil and natural gas from the CAS through Turkey, a friendly NATO nation, rather than increase the number of pipelines through Russia or worse still (from the US point of view) through Iran to the Persian Sea. Laying the pipeline to Turkey had Congressional support. House Resolution 349 was introduced October 10, 1998, expressing that Congress "...strongly supports any assistance that can be provided to the Government and people of Turkmenistan to build pipelines or take any other measures that will lead to the resumption of natural gas exports."³⁵ Success came on August 6, 1999, when three agreements were signed between Turkmenistan and oil companies PSG (an American company) and Royal Dutch Shell to establish a partnership to develop a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.³⁶ The US government was pleased with the agreement because the East-West gas pipeline will "...foster regional cooperation among the new states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, bolster their independence

and prosperity, strengthen their integration with Europe via Turkey, enhance the energy security of the United States and our allies, and create business opportunities for companies from the U.S. and other countries.”³⁷ The natural gas pipeline will “...deliver Turkmen natural gas across the floor of the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Georgia and on to the Turkish city of Erzurum. The overall length of the gas pipeline should come to about 2,000 kilometers...and cost...about \$3 billion.”³⁸

Another effort to develop a pipeline from the Central Asian region is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In 1999, President Clinton was “...present in Istanbul, Turkey for the signing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline agreement...” backed by the Export-Import Bank and OPIC.³⁹ The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is planned to begin delivering oil by 2004. Like economic power, the military instrument of power has also been an effective engagement tool in Central Asia.

Military interests

The United States’ military is an instrument of power that supports national policy. Ensuring a nuclear-free Central Asia is one of the U.S.’ top national security concerns. The U.S. also ensures security and stability in the region through appropriate military security assistance actions, a Central Asian Battalion peacekeeping force, and building alliances with the CAS.

Nuclear dismantling in Kazakhstan

Getting nuclear weapons out of Kazakhstan (as well as out of other NIS) after the fall of the Soviet Union was a national priority for U.S. and world security. In February 1994, President Clinton remarked, “One of my highest national security priorities has been to ensure that the

breakup of the former Soviet Union did not lead to the creation of new nuclear states. Such a development would increase the risks of nuclear accidents, diversion, or terrorism.”⁴⁰

Kazakhstan was the object of considerable US interest after the USSR broke up in 1991, leaving Kazakhstan a “temporary” nuclear state. Kazakhstan “...inherited 370 nuclear bombs and 1,040 warheads on 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles.”⁴¹ President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan delayed moving the nuclear warheads and signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), citing national security concerns (sitting between two nuclear powers, Russia and China) and lack of funds to do so.⁴²

After negotiation, one year later, in February 1994, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan agreed to abide by the NPT’s clauses and begin removing its nuclear weapons in exchange for “...a substantial increase in the United States assistance to Kazakhstan from \$91 million last year to over \$311 million this year. In addition, we [the U.S.] are prepared to extend another \$85 million in funds for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in 1994 and 1995.”⁴³ The U.S. met one of its key security objectives by beginning the process of removing nuclear weapons from a CAS, and Kazakhstan not only received the “hard currency” it needed to dismantle its nuclear weapons, but developmental aid as well.

Military strategy and Central Asia

The 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS) provided strategic direction of the Armed Forces for the next three to five years.⁴⁴ In the 1997 NMS, three concepts were presented as an integrated strategic approach for the military to use: “**Shape** the international environment, **Respond** to the full spectrum of crises, and **Prepare Now** for an uncertain future.”⁴⁵ The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), one of the Department of Defense’s five unified major commands, is responsible for providing for U.S. security interests in the five CAS, as well as 20

other nations that comprise “the Central Region.” USCENTCOM follows the NMS’ direction by publishing their own theater strategy for overseeing operations in their Area Of Responsibility, the Central Region. In its booklet, “Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century,” the U.S. Central Command expressed its strategic goals for South and Central Asia (See Figure 2).⁴⁶ When interviewed about USCENTCOM’s engagement with Central Asia, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Squires, Plans and Programs Directorate (J-5), said that CENTCOM is “robustly engaged in Central Asia in the long term” and General A.C. Zinni, Commander in Chief of USCENTCOM, is absolutely committed to Central Asia and it is “high on his agenda.”⁴⁷

Alliances

The U.S., NATO, and USCENTCOM have established and improved military cooperation and security in Central Asia through extensive military contacts such as training and participation in the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT), a multinational military peacekeeping force and part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. CENTRASBAT 97, Central Asia’s first peacekeeping exercise, was held in Kazakhstan. Over 500 U.S. soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division flew 19 hours and 7,700 miles to join 40 airborne troops from three CAS and soldiers from Russia and Turkey.⁴⁸ According to U.S. Marine Corps General John J. Sheehan, the Commander of U.S. Atlantic Command, “The message, I guess, is that there is no nation on the face of the earth that we cannot get to.”⁴⁹ The following year, CENTRASBAT 98, was held in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in late September 1998 and was composed of army units from the neighboring nations of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Russia, as well as Turkey and the U.S.⁵⁰ Continuing peacekeeping efforts through combined exercises are essential to supporting President Clinton’s security efforts.

Additionally, NATO has engaged all five of the Central Asian nations as Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Member Countries, also known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA	
Strategic Goals	
• Foster peaceful states	
• Regional cooperation on weapons of mass destruction, drugs and terrorism	
• Integrate states into international security and economic organization	
• Promote military professionalism	
Means	
• Enhanced coordination with USEUCOM, USACOM & USPACOM	
• Military to military contacts	
• Partnership for Peace and joint exercises	
• Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRASBAT)	

Figure 3. US Central Command's Theater strategy for South and Central Asia⁵¹

program.⁵² Launched by NATO in January 1994, the PfP program "...is a process that brings NATO Allies and Partners together in a vast programme of joint defense and security-related activities..." from those that are purely military and defense related to crisis management and civil emergency planning.⁵³

The United States government, through US Central Command, also has a National Guard-Central Asian State partnership program, through which Army and Air National Guard units coordinate with and participate in bi-lateral defensive exercises and training opportunities with the five CAS.

The US military (and also through NATO) has increased its overall engagement in Central Asia through the Partnership for Peace program, the CENTRASBAT peacekeeping force, and the National Guard-Central Asian State partnership program. When the US military sends its

military personnel halfway around the world to participate in field exercises in Central Asia, it is sending a clear signal that the area is important to national interests and deserves protection.

Notes

¹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999.

² Ibid.

³ Two works: Freeman, Chas. W., Jr. *The Diplomat's Dictionary*. U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 1997, p. 140; and The President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p 1-2.

⁴ Ibid. 10.

⁵ Ibid. 10.

⁶ Malik, Hafeez, ed. *Central Asia, Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 130.

⁷ Ibid, p. 130.

⁸ Talbott, Strobe. "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia." U.S. *Department of State Dispatch* Vol 5, Issue 19 (May 9, 1994), p 280.

⁹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p 1.

¹⁰ Ibid, p 29-34.

¹¹ Congressional Bill Summary and Status for the 105th and 106th Congress. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

¹² US House. *Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997*. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 1999. H.R. 1152.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Congressional Record, October 18, 1999, pp H10142-43.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Congressional Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

¹⁹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 32

²⁰ Ibid, p. 34.

²¹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p 32.

²² President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 30.

²³ Clinton, Bill, President of the United States. Speech. Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe Summit, Istanbul, Turkey, November 18, 1999.

²⁴ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 30.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 33

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²⁶ Talbott, Strobe. "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia." U.S. *Department of State Dispatch* Vol 5, Issue 19 (May 9, 1994), p 281.

²⁷ Ibid. p 281.

²⁸ Talbott, Strobe. "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia." U.S. *Department of State Dispatch* Vol 5, Issue 19 (May 9, 1994), p 281.

²⁹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 33.

³⁰ Ibid, p.32

³¹ Ibid. 12.

³² Ibid. 11.

³³ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 33.

³⁴ Ibid, pp 24-25.

³⁵ US House. *A concurrent resolution...that the United States strongly supports any assistance...to build pipelines...that will lead to the resumption of natural gas exports.* 105th Congress, 1st session, 1998. H. Con. R. 349.

³⁶ Rubin, James P., U.S. Department of State spokesman. "Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline." U.S. State Department Home Page. On-line. Internet. 6 August 1999. Available from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990806.html>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Mikhailov, Vladimir and Smolnikov, Georgy. "The Caspian Sea." *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* Vol 51, Issue 9 (March 31, 1999), p 19.

³⁹ President. Document. "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." The White House, December 1999, p. 34.

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State, *The U.S. and Kazakhstan: A Strategic Economic and Political Relationship*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Communication, February 1994.

⁴¹ Ustiugov, Mikhail. "A temporarily nuclear state." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, Vol 49, Issue 8 (October 93): p 33.

⁴² Ibid. p 33.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, *The U.S. and Kazakhstan: A Strategic Economic and Political Relationship*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Communication, February 1994.

⁴⁴ National Military Strategy of the United States of America. September 1997, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴⁶ U.S. Central Command. *Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century*. Published by U.S. Central Command, 1999, p 14.

⁴⁷ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Squires, USA, Plans and Policy Directorate/CCJ5, USCENTCOM, 16 March 2000.

⁴⁸ *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 September 1997.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ McHugh, Jane; Elfers, Steve. "Showtime for Sergeants." *Army Times*, Vol 59, Issue 17 (23 November 1998: p. 14).

⁵¹ U.S. Central Command. *Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century*. Published by U.S. Central Command, 1999, p 20.

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⁵² "Partnership for Peace-An Enhanced and more operational partnership." NATO Basic Fact Sheets. On-line. Internet, 26 January 2000. Available from <http://www.nato.int>.

⁵³ Ibid.

Part 6

Benefits and Significance of U.S. National Interests in Central Asia and a Possible Rivalry for Influence

Benefits

The long-term benefits of having a policy that considers Central Asia important to the U.S. will be having a more secure (less volatile) region and access to its significant natural resources. Specifically, this means that weapons of mass destruction won't be permitted on Central Asian soil; that the U.S. won't allow direct intervention in the CAS by terrorists, Islamic extremists or her neighbors; and nations everywhere will have access to the vast oil and natural gas and other resources (gold, iron ore, lead, zinc, copper, manganese, and other resources) that could be available for export.

Promoting democracy and market economies in Central Asia will in the long run contribute to stability because democratically elected governments are more responsive to their electorate and generally, are more stable than other forms of government. Stable states attract international private investment and can get International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other loans, if needed, far more readily than unstable states.

The NSS outlines a strategy of "...shaping the international security environment, responding to threats and crisis, and preparing for an uncertain future."¹ President Clinton's administration puts more emphasis on the shaping portion of the strategy because putting effort

up front (proactive effort) is cheaper in the long run than responding to crisis. The benefits of *shaping* the international environment, not *responding* to crisis and threats, unless necessary, are significant: time to build alliances and cooperation to tackle world problems like spiraling arms sales, proliferation of WMD, terrorism, drug trafficking, and world health and environmental problems.

Significance

That the United States has clearly stated it has national interests in Central Asia is significant for several reasons. First, making public announcements and publishing the U.S.' interests in documents such as the NSS commits the U.S. to action-engagement, development, and protection—that is, security—to secure those interests. The executive and legislative branches of government will commit resources to further national foreign policies. The engagement and development that is clearly stated and the protection that are implied are carried out with the four instruments of power: political, economic, military, and informational. Important national interests cost nations some amount of their national treasure in the form of the military to defend those interests and funding to support engagement and development.

Second, publicly and clearly identifying national interests informs other nations what is important to the U.S. and what the U.S. considers worth defending. The U.S. is able to synchronize its use of all of the instruments of power, if and when necessary, to deter others from creating instability in the region. If deterrence fails, the U.S. has the ability to militarily defend its interests in the region. Central Asia's neighbors, especially regional powers Russia and China and the world at large take note of American engagement and development actions in nations around the world. Other nations notice where and under what conditions the U.S. sets her feet and how deeply those footprints are sunk.

Third, once the U.S. announces a national interest, it doesn't usually back off from the interest. The U.S. has long-standing commitments with Western Europe (53 years) starting with the Marshall Plan and continuing with its participation in NATO; South Korea (over 50 years) and the U.S. pledge to protect its security; and Iraq (9 years) to protect Kurdish and Shiite minorities and to enforce U.N. resolutions. The U.S. has shown that once a national interest to a particular nation or region is identified, the U.S. will commit troops and treasure to ensure success.

Last, a probable outcome of the U.S. stating it has a national interest in Central Asia is the potential for rivalry, possibly even conflict, with other nations also having interests in Central Asia, primarily Russia. The next section will discuss the possibilities of an U.S. rivalry with Russia for Central Asia.

Rivalry for influence

United States policy in regards to Central Asia is only eight years old. Yet, in that eight years, millions of dollars of aid have been given and investments made engaging and developing Central Asia. The U.S. will continue to engage Central Asia. Doing so has implications for rivalry, possibly even conflict, with Russia because Russia also has significant national interests in Central Asia.

Russian interests in the CAS

Russia has important and multiple interests in Central Asia and has a long history of engagement, and through the USSR, domination of Central Asia. Russia's strategic interests, like the U.S.', are political, economic, and military. Russia's national interests are its significant Russian diaspora living throughout Central Asia, her border with Central Asia that she considers

her “near abroad”, having Caspian Sea oil and gas pipelines run north through Russia to the West, and increasing trade with Central Asia. Laura Payne, at the Center for Defense Information, wrote in September 1998’s Foreign Policy In Focus magazine, that “Russian politicians have come to believe that the U.S. seeks even further hegemony and Russian weakness...Russia is...troubled by U.S. intervention in Caspian politics...The Caspian Sea has for centuries been viewed by Russia as within its sphere of influence, and Russians resent the American presence in the region.”² Russia’s interest in influencing where billions of gallons worth of oil and natural gas goes is partly economic of course, but more importantly, it is political.

Russia, no less now than in conducting foreign policy for hundreds of years, wants to influence the course of other states’ events. Russia still retains relative strength over its southern neighbors. In Tajikistan, with the approval of the government, Russia intervened on the side of the neo-communist government to end the civil war. Russia is the most likely of any major or minor regional power to militarily intervene in a CAS because it has more to gain or lose in the CAS than any other outside nation.

Possible rivalry for influence and increased stake in outcomes of internal affairs

The implications of the U.S. pursuing strategic interests in Central Asia is that potentially, the U.S. may interfere with Russian designs there. Although one cannot say now that a rivalry for influence in the five CAS exists between Russia and the United States (except over the transportation routes of the Caspian Sea oil and gas—see Part 3), the potential for rivalry does increase with intensity of engagement by Russia and the US. Two reasons support this assertion. First, as Russia and the U.S. continue engagement with one or more CAS, Russia and the U.S. have an increased stake in the internal affairs of the CAS. This could lead to intervention in the

internal decisions of a Central Asian State to affect outcomes if a crisis threatened a strategic interest. This may destabilize the state or the region, negatively impacting the other interested party. Second, Russia and the U.S, each trying to increase its share of influence in the region, might respond negatively to another nation's moves in the region, especially if it meant their loss of access to a resource. For example, the U.S. has made it clear that it has "...a vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil sources."³ Should another nation deny the free flow of oil, I believe the U.S. will likely respond decisively, using a combination of its instruments of power.

Taken to an extreme, either Russia or the U.S. could block and deny (physically using the military, or through trade sanctions or high tariffs) others' access to resources in times of crisis to ensure their own uninterrupted flow of resources, especially crucial oil.

However, another point of view is given by Dr. Haghayeghi who explained in an interview, that Russia, weakened economically and militarily in its reform efforts to become a market economy, can't respond significantly to threats to its interests, including those in the CAS.⁴ Although Russia has security interests in the CAS, it can't block any US or other nation's moves now because of its weakened state. He wondered if Russia will act rationally in the face of threats to its vital interests or resort in another way. Dr. Haghayeghi advised a wait-and-see approach since Vladimar Putin is now Russia's new President. In my analysis of Russia's capabilities, motives, and based on history, including its current armed opposition to Chetnya's independence movement, Russia will do what it can and must, economically an/or militarily, to defend its strategic interests regardless of world opinion.

Avoiding a conflict of interests

To prevent a collision between Russia and the U.S. (and any other nation) in Central Asia, the U.S. should to do two things. First, the U.S. would make a clear policy announcement that

the U.S. has a large stake in ensuring the security, stability, and continued democratization and economic progress of the NIS in general, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in particular. Second, the U.S. should work with Russia to improve regional prosperity, peace, cooperation, and integrate the CAS into the larger world community. It is important that the NIS and the CAS see Russia as being close to co-equals, not former imperialists.

The cost of not publicly stating what are and what are not U.S. strategic interests in the CAS could lead to misunderstanding the region's importance to the U.S. Some historians say that a partial cause of North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, starting the Korean War, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, triggering the Gulf War, were because the North Korean and Iraqi leaders had received conflicting signals as to whether the US considered South Korea and Kuwait important interests.

Developing a Central Asian Concept Plan (CONPLAN)

I recommend USCENTCOM develop a Concept Plan (CONPLAN), part of the U.S. military's deliberate planning process, to plan a military campaign to protect U.S. national interests in the Central Asian States. Because Russia has multiple national interests in the CAS and the ability to intervene in the CAS, writing a CONPLAN that would involve them would be a prudent action. According to Joint Publication 5-0, a CONPLAN "...is an operation plan in an abbreviated format" that requires "...considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN" (Operations Plan).⁵ A CONPLAN is a skeleton military operations plan written in peacetime to respond to a potential crisis threatening national interests, to support large-scale contingencies that require detailed prior planning, and to support multinational planning.⁶ Having a CONPLAN would provide pre-planned contingency actions, to include a range of

deterrent actions (flexible deterrent options), and should those fail, stronger military responses to threats against U.S. interests.

Notes

¹ President. Document. “A National Security Strategy For A New Century.” The White House, December 1999, p 5.

² Payne, Laura. “In Focus: U.S.-Russia Security Relations.” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Volume 3, Number 26 (September 1998).

³ President. Document. “A National Security Strategy For A New Century.” The White House, December 1999, p 25.

⁴ Haghayeghi, Dr. Mehrdad. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Southwest Missouri State University. Oral interview 31 January 2000.

⁵ Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 1995, p. I-11.

⁶ Ibid, p. I-11.

Part 7

Conclusion

The large quantity of engagement and development actions in Central Asia by the U.S. is a deliberate result of her policies regarding Central Asia. As stated earlier, identification of strategic (and thus national) interests leads to foreign policy being made to support those interests. The U.S.’ policies are a result of two presidential administration’s (primarily President Clinton’s administration) realization that the U.S. had national interests in Central Asia. The NSS explains that the US’ strategic interests in the CAS are (1) supporting continued democratization, (2) promoting prosperity, (3) enhancing security, (4) pursuing arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and (5) integration in the larger community (political and economic goals).

The U.S. considers her interests in Central Asia as important: not crucial enough to be considered “vital”, but for too important to be considered in the lowest third priority. The primary significance of the national interests in Central Asia is that the U.S. will apply the four instruments of power to ensure continued access to the region. The U.S. will be willing and able to use a combination of all of its instruments of power, if and when necessary, to deter others from creating instability in the region it considers important, and if deterrence fails, defend its interests in that region with military forces. By making public announcements and publishing the U.S.’ interests in documents such as the NSS, the U.S. commits herself to continued engagement,

development, and protection of her interests in Central Asia. When the U.S. stated her national interest in Central Asia, she set up the possibility of a rivalry for interest, even a possibility of conflict, with Russia. Russia also has national interests in Central Asia and has a long history of engagement there. invites some level of conflict with other nations also having interests in Central Asia, primarily Russia.

There are long-term benefits of having a policy that considers Central Asia important to the U.S.: having a more secure (less volatile) region and access to its significant natural resources. The U.S., the region, and the world will benefit because of increased democratization, market economies, stable borders, a nuclear free zone, and access to the vast oil and natural gas and other resources that exist.

Freedom isn't free; nor is ensuring prosperity and security in a far off corner of the world called Central Asia. The U.S., through The National Security Strategy of 1999, states that Central Asian is an important, thus national interest. Commitment from the U.S. Congress in the form of U.S. taxpayer dollars are needed to provide economic development packages to ensure the Central Asian nations continue their walk down the path towards democracy and market-based economies. Once engaged, the US cannot fail to continue developing and shaping their future to ensure inclusion into the small, but growing club of democratic systems and ultimate integration in the world economy. I am not advocating colonialism or imperialism, but democratization and economic investment. Future U.S. Presidential administrations need to take a long-term view of the opportunities that continued engagement and development with Central Asia presents. Central Asia needs continued outside investment to develop; the U.S. can extend its hand now or watch others offer theirs.

Appendix A

Commonwealth of Independent States



Appendix B

Comparison of Central Asian States

Source: CIA Fact Book. On-line. Internet. 1999. Available at <http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/index.html>.

Factor	Kazakhstan	Krygyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Land boundaries	12,012 sq km	198,500 sq km	143,100 sq km	488,100 sq km	447,400 sq km
Natural resources	major deposits of gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium	abundant hydroelectric potential; significant deposits of gold and rare earth metals; coal, oil, natural gas, nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, zinc	significant hydro-power potential, some petroleum, uranium, mercury, coal, oil, natural gas, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten	petroleum, natural gas, coal, sulfur, salt	natural gas, petroleum, coal, gold, uranium, silver, copper, lead and zinc, tungsten, molybdenum
Ethnic groups	Kazakh(Qazaq) 46% Russian 34.7%, Ukrainian 4.9%, German 3.1% Tatar 1.9%,	Kirghiz 52.4%, Russian 18%, Ukrainian 2.5%, German 2.4% Uzbek 12.9	Tajik 64.9%, Russian 3.5% (declining because of emigration) Uzbek 25%	Turkmen 77% Russian 6.7%, Uzbek 9.2%, Kazakh 2%, other 5.1%	Uzbek 80% Russian 5.5% Tajik 5% Kazakh 3% Karakalpak 2.5%

	other 7.1% (1996)	other 11.8%	other 6.6%	Tatar 1.5% (1996)
Religions Factor	Muslim 47%, Kazakhstan	Muslim 75%, Krygyzstan	Sunni Muslim 80%, Tajikistan	Muslim 89%, Turkmenistan
Religions	Russian Orthodox 44%, Protestant 2%, other 7%	Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%	Shi'a Muslim 5%	Eastern Orthodox 9% (mostly Sunnis), unknown 2% Eastern Orthodox 9%, other 3%
Languages	Kazakh (Qazaq) (state language) 40% Russian (official, used in daily business) 66%	Kirghiz (Kyrgyz)- official language Russian—official language (by law Mar 1996)	Tajik (official), Russian widely used in government and business	Turkmen 72%, Russian 12%, Uzbek 9%, other 7%
Population	16,824,825 (July 1999 est.)	4,546,055 (July 1999 est.)	6,102,854 (July 1999 est.)	4,366,383 (July 1999 est.)
Land use	arable land: 12% 1Perm. crops: 11% perm. pastures: 57% 2Forest/wdland: 4% other: 16%	arable land: 7% perm crops: 0% perm pastures: 44% forest/wdland: 4% other: 45%	arable land: 6% perm crops: 0% perm pastures: 25% forest/wdland: 4% other: 65% (1993 est)	arable land: 3% perm crops: 0% perm pastures: 63% forest/ wdland: 8% other: 26%
Climate	continental, cold winters and hot summers, arid and semiarid	dry continental to polar in high Tien Shan; subtropical in southwest (Fergana Valley); temperate	midlatitude continental, hot summers, mild winters; semiarid to polar in Pamir Mountains	subtropical desert
Literacy (age 15 Read & write)	total population: 98%	total population: 97%	total population: 98%	total population: 98%
				total population: 99%

Factor	Kazakhstan	Krygyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Life expectancy at birth	total population: 63.39 years male: 57.92 years female: 69.13 years (1999 est.)	total population: 63.57 years male: 59.25 years female: 68.1 years (1999 est.)	total population: 64.28 years male: 61.15 years female: 67.57 years (1999 est.)	total population: 61.11 years male: 57.48 years female: 64.91 years (1999 est.)	total population: 63.91 years male: 60.29 years female: 67.71 years (1999 est.)
President	Nursultan Nazarbayev	Askar Akayer		Saparmurat Niyazov	Islam Karimov
Government type	republic	republic	republic	republic	republic
Capital	Astana	Bishkek	Dushanbe	Ashgabat	Tashkent (Toshkent)

1 = Perm= Permanent,

2 = Wdland = Woodland

Appendix C

The Share of Central Asian States in the World's Oil and Natural Gas Industry

Source: Rumer, Boris and Zhukov Stanislav, ed. *Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998.

Country	<u>Share of world production (in percent)</u>		<u>Estimated reserves</u>		<u>Natural gas</u>		<u>World rank in terms of reserves</u>	
	Oil 1995	Natural Gas 1995	Oil 1996 (a)	Natural Gas 1996 (a)	Oil (billions of tons)	(trillions of cubic meters)	Oil	Natural Gas
Turkmenistan	0.1	1.4	0.2	2.0	6.3	15.5	9	3
Kazakhstan	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.2	6.1	5.9	10	5
Uzbekistan	0.2	2.1	0.3	2.3	0.3	2.0	---	13-15

(a) First half of 1996 only

Appendix D

Plans and Forecasts for the Increase in the Production of Oil and Natural Gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan


Table Sources: Rumer, Boris and Zhukov, Stanislav, *Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence* (information compiled from various sources)

Country	Product	1996 (a)	2000	2010
Turkmenistan	Oil (millions of tons)	4.0	28.0	80.0
	Natural gas (billions of cubic meters)	35.1	130.0	230.0
Kazakhstan	Oil (millions of tons) (b)	23.0	100.0	170.0 (c)
	Natural gas (billions of cubic meters)	6.4	15.4	36.1
Uzbekistan	Oil (millions of tons)	7.5	10.0	-----
	Natural gas (billions of cubic meters)	49.0	55.3	-----

(a) Actual figure (b) Including gas condensate (c) Estimate for the year 2012, not 2010


Appendix E

Central Asian Oil




Appendix F

Central Asian Natural Gas



Appendix G

Comparison of Central Asian Energy



Appendix H

Short Title: Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999¹

106th Congress, 1st Session, In the House of Representatives, March 17, 1999

Section 2, Findings. Congress makes the following findings (verbatim):

1. The ancient Silk Road, once the economic lifeline of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, traversed much of the territory now within the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
2. Economic interdependence spurred mutual cooperation among the peoples along the Silk Road and restoration of the historic relationships and economic ties between those peoples is an important element of ensuring their sovereignty as well as the success of democratic and market reforms.
3. The development of strong political, economic, and security ties between countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the West will foster stability in this region which is vulnerable to political and economic pressures from the south, north, and east.
4. The development of open market economies and open democratic systems in the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia will provide positive incentives for international private investment, increased trade, and other forms of commercial interactions with the rest of the world.
5. Many of the countries of the South Caucasus have secular Muslim governments that are seeking closer alliance with the United States and that have active and cordial diplomatic relations with Israel.
6. The region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities to reduce the dependence of the United States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.
7. United States foreign policy and international assistance should be narrowly targeted to support the economic and political independence as well as democracy building, free market economies, human rights, and regional economic integration of the countries of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Section 3. Policy of the United States. (verbatim)

It shall be the policy of the United States in the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia—

1. to promote and strengthen independence, sovereignty, democratic government, and respect for human rights;
2. to promote tolerance, pluralism, and understanding and counter racism and anti-Semitism;
3. to assist actively the resolution of regional conflicts and to facilitate the removal of impediments to cross-border commerce;
4. to promote friendly relations and economic cooperation;
5. to help promote market-oriented principles and practices;
6. to assist in the development of the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, and energy and trade on an East-West axis in order to build strong international relations and commerce between those countries and the stable, democratic, and market-oriented countries of the Euro-Atlantic Community; and
7. to support United States business interests and investments in the region.

Notes

¹ Congressional Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress. On-line. Internet. Available from <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

Appendix I

Assessments of Engagement in Central Asia

The following is presented to offer an assessment of the results of American and Western political and economic engagement and development in Central Asia .

Democratization

Despite efforts by the US to encourage democracy, there hasn't been much progress in improving the basics of democracy since 1991: the rule and enforcement of law, free and open presses, opposition political parties, and a decrease in corruption. The range of improvement towards moving to Western-style democracies is extremely varied. Neil MacFarland, a Rhodes Scholar who received his doctorate in International Relations from the University of Oxford, and is now a Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations at Oxford, divided up the region into three categories to assess their progress into democratic reform: "...those in which no obvious progress is evident at any level (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan); those in which there is some evidence of democratization, but in which governments use coercive and administrative measures systematically to limit freedoms of speech, association and electoral choice (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan); and those in which progress towards democracy is accompanied by continuing significant transgressions of Western norms (Kyrgyzstan)".¹

Throughout the region, Doctor MacFarlane notes, there is vast corruption, a high level of "systemic police abuse of political opponents and other persons in their custody", and rigged

elections for parliaments and presidents.² For instance, in Turkmenistan, national elections were held in December 1999 and nearly all of the 104 candidates for the 50 available seats were from President Saparmurat Niyazov's Democratic Party.³ Mr. Niyazov was made President for life on December 28, 1999, after Turkmenistan's People's Council and parliament asked him to remain in power indefinitely.⁴ In Turkmenistan, Presidential job security is high; one is voted in "for life". Uzbekistan held parliament elections on December 5, 1999, with heavy restrictions on who and how candidates could run for office.⁵ President Karimov of Uzbekistan has suppressed most opposition groups while the country is making its transition to democracy and a market economy.⁶ Kyrgyzstan may be one country that transfers power to a successor: President Askar Akayev said he intended to step down in 2000 after serving since before the Soviet break-up.⁷ President Akayev runs a more "liberal" and open government than the other Central Asian republics and has made good progress with market reforms.⁸ Kazakhstan has an incomplete legal framework and a "low-level harassment of civil society organizations expressing views" contrary to the governments; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have basically made no forward progress in democratization; throughout the CAS there is a lack of unions because power rests with company directors and managers; and in 1998, the Kyrgyz Human Rights movement lost its legal status.⁹ The U.S. Department of State (DoS) criticized Kazakhstan's lack of fair, free elections for parliamentary seats in October, 1999. The DoS, noting that while "Promotion of democracy and human rights remains a fundamental component of U.S. policy toward Kazakhstan", the elections fell short of expectations and were widely interfered with "by executive authorities in the electoral process".¹⁰ The Human Rights Watch organization has many cases of abuses of freedom of the press and human rights. Degrees of improvement can be noted: the start of women's rights organizations; and the press, although regularly repressed, is

still far freer than what existed in the Soviet era. Qualitatively, the CAS are freer now than when under Soviet domination, but one cannot say that in any of the CAS the common citizen experiences Western style democracy or freedom.

Economic assessment

There has been significant economic development throughout the CAS since 1991. The Western economic goals have been to increase privatization, marketization, economic stabilization, and integration of the economies of the region into the larger world economy. However, overall, the result of economic engagement is mixed; on the positive side, state economies have stabilized, many formerly state run industries have been privatized, there has been a lot of outside investment into the natural resource market (oil, natural gas, gold), and trade has increased within and without the CAS.¹¹ Negatively, the large lump of lump of investment has only gone into developing natural resources, Central Asian states have reduced spending on public health, social services, and education to pay off their national debt, and many people are poorer now than during state-run economies.¹² For example, 40-80 percent of the population is poor, unemployment and underemployment remain high, and government provided health and education has deteriorated, and few people have pensions.¹³ Most people live in poverty.

Prices started to stabilize in 1995 after Central Asian policy makers followed the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Also, governments are making progress in closing the gap between expenditures and revenues and privatization (share of the private sector in GDP) is up. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan implemented tax reform laws; Kazakhstan started privatization; Kyrgyzstan established a stock market.¹⁴

The governments in the CAS are taking Western economic advise and accepting investment because doing so doesn't threaten a regime, only strengthens it; it benefits the society and government in general; it improves the business infrastructure which gives lasting improvement; and improves a nation's economic status and integration into international organizations (IMF, World Bank).

Assessing the overall impact of engagement

Assessing the impact of American (and Western) engagement in the CAS is difficult to do; the assessment is influenced by who is doing it and while some assessments can measure degrees or amounts of improvement, some are subjective. That said, Westerners see an uneven record of accomplishment: a better record of economic reform and private business setup but a marked absence of much improvement in moving the CAS' governments towards democratization. Doctor MacFarlane summed up the outcomes of political and economic engagement by writing, "The impact of activities in the general area of democratization and political reform occupies the middle ground. The economic record is more impressive, but the region's process has not measured up to Western aspiration ...With regard to Western state and private interests, the record is somewhat more positive, though still varied".¹⁵ Undersecretary Talbott promotes a "win-win" or "positive sum" engagement policy where all "responsible players in the Caucasus and Central Asia [will] be winners", not a "zero-sum" game where great powers' competition works to the disadvantage of the people who live there.¹⁶

Notes

¹ U.S. Department of State, *The U.S. and Kazakhstan: A Strategic Economic and Political Relationship*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Communication, February 1994, p. 25.

² Ibid. p. 25.

Notes

³ "Parliamentary elections held in Turkmenistan." CNN.com, 12 December 1999, CNN on-line.

⁴ "Turkmenistan's president made leader for life." CNN.com. 28 December 1999, CNN on-line.

⁵ Uzbekistan holds election for new parliament." CNN.com, 5 December 1999, CNN on-line.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Kyrgyz president reportedly won't stand again." CNN.com, 15 September 1999, CNN on-line.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. pp 26-27.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, 202-647-2492. *Kazakhstan: OSCE report on October parliamentary election.* January 24, 2000.

¹¹ MacFarlane, Dr. Neil. *Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia.* Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999, pp 47-50.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ MacFarlane, Neil. *Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia.* London, England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999. P 23.

¹⁶ Talbott, Strobe. "A farewell to flashman: American policy in the Caucasus." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* Vol 8, Issue 6 (Jul 97): 13.

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